In reversing a four-level enhancement for being an organizer or leader of the criminal activity, the Court emphasized that it is not sufficient to show that the defendant played an "important or essential role" in the crime. The Court stated: "Much of the evidence the government now cites to support ...
The Court first rejected the Government's contention that Guideline Amendment was a mere "clarification" of § 3A1.1. It wrote: "notwithstanding the Sentencing Commission's description of Amendent 521 as a "clarification," we hold that applying the new language set forth in U.S.S.G. SS 3A1.1 comment. (n.2) (Nov. 1995), as opposed to ...
Case held that, after the initial sentencing, the district court lacked the authority to alter the original sentence; and that such an amendment violated the "law of the case" doctrine.
In this case the district court originally imposed a Guideline's sentence of 57 months; but four days after the imposition ...
Case held that district courts have the authority to reduce the amount of drugs attributable to a defendant by any amount tainted by sentencing entrapment.
In this drug case the district court found that the amount of drugs charged to the defendant had been artificially increased due to "sentencing entrapment". ...
Case held that, after the initial sentencing, the district court lacked the authority to alter the original sentence; and that such an amendment violated the "law of the case" doctrine.
This is a powerful and important decision about the prosecution's practice of deferring disclosure of materials about its own witnesses until after those witnesses have testified, as permitted under the Jencks Act [18 U.S.C. § 3500]. Judge Young's order not only unequivocally establishes a rule in Massachusetts that "necessarily requires ...
Although the Second Circuit, in this case, confirmed the general proposition that a sentencing court may increase a defendant's sentence for unconvicted conduct based on proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the court also suggested that a more rigorous standard should be used in determining disputed aspects of relevant ...
This is another case that shows the broad scope of "relevant conduct" as that term is used in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 of the Guidelines. Here, the Fourth Circuit joins the Second and Tenth Circuits in holding that a dismissal of counts pursuant to a plea agreement does not bar a ...
Case held that the Constitution does not require that a defendant be provided with information concerning parole eligibility for a guilty plea to be knowingly and voluntarily made.
Court held that district court had no right to order pretrial incarceration for medical evaluation after defendant gave notice that she intended to offer dimninished capacity defense.
Here the Court held that the BOP could not, through its Inmate Financial Responsibilty Program, lawfully exercise the judicial responsibility of establishing a payment schedule for court imposed monetary penalties.
United States v. Stover, 93 F.3d 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (Judge McMillian)
Smullen v. United States, 94 F.3d 20 (1st ...
Here the Court held that district court had erred when it treated the "sophisticated means" provision as a characteristic of the individual defendant rather than as an offense characteristic - and therefore the enhancement should have been applied even if the sophisticated means were employed by the defendant's accounting firm ...
The Second Circuit vacated a sentence imposed by the dictrict court which refused to apply the sophisticated means enhancement of § 2T1.1(b)(2) on the grounds that it was the accountants for the defendant - not the defendant - who had engaged in the sophisticated means. The Court rejected that philosophy ...
Case held that unless a defendant claims that he was deprived of counsel, a sentencing court is not permitted to disregard a prior conviction for purposes of 18 USC § 924(e), but defendant could later obtain habeas review of that conviction.
In this case the district court elected not to ...
In this rather strange ruling, the Seventh Circuit vacated a conviction on the grounds that the district court had applied the incorrect standard in excluding and limiting proffered expert testimony concerning the defendant’s "susceptibility" to coercion and to giving false confessions. The defendant was convicted of kidnaping a child and ...
QUOTE OF THE WEEK - The uneven playing field created by the Jencks Act.
"The failure to provide full disclosure of the government's case early in the proceedings limits a defendant's ability to investigate the background and character of government witnesses and the veracity of their testimony. For example, strict ...
This case is noted because it explores an issue rarely discussed - the scope of Rule 609(a)(1) of the
Fed.R.Evid. as it applies to the impeachment of a witness (here the defendant) through impermissible
cross-examination into the details of his prior conviction. The defendant in this case testified on his ...
Court remanded case for a determination of whether the petitioner's plea was voluntary based on claim that counsel was ineffective for giving erroneous advice concerning his eligibility for parole if he pled guilty.
This case shows a somewhat autocratic approach by a judge to a defendant's attempt "to offer the defenses of diminished capacaty and/or mental disease and/or defect and/or incapacity to form specific intent" pursuant to Rule 12.2(b) of the Fed.R.Crim.P. When the defendant in this case gave notice of her intent ...
The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Bailey v. U.S., 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) has led to the reversal of a large number of gun convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). In Bailey, the Court ruled that in order to sustain a conviction for using and carrying a firearm during and ...
Case held that finding of mental disease or defect required for insanity defense could not be based on defendant's alcohol consupmtion or drug consumption.
In a case of first impression, the Second Circuit ruled that the district court did not err in instructing the jury that in order to find ...
Case held that finding of mental disease or defect required for insanity defense could not be based on defendant's alcohol consupmtion or drug consumption.
United States v. Stover, 93 F.3d 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (Judge McMillian)
Smullen v. United States, 94 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996) (Judge Campbell)
United States v. Mortimer, 94 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 1996) (Judge Mahoney)
Each of these three cases reviews one or more issues in the rapidly growing ...
Here the Court rejected the defendant's argument that the 1994 amendments to 18 USC §§ 3553 and 3565 rendered mandatory the suggested prison sentences contained in Chapter Seven of the Guidelines.
Here the Court held that the amount of loss for sentencing purposes could be based on the "intended loss", even though the proposed victim had "smelled a rat" and informed authorities, precluding any actual loss.
In this case a wire fraud scheme was interrupted before any concrete harm at all ...
United States v. Stover, 93 F.3d 1379 (8th Cir. 1996) (Judge McMillian)
Smullen v. United States, 94 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1996) (Judge Campbell)
United States v. Mortimer, 94 F.3d 89 (2nd Cir. 1996) (Judge Mahoney)
Each of these three cases reviews one or more issues in the rapidly growing ...
