Here the Court held that in a prosecution of a felon for possession of a weapon, it was proper for the sentencing judge to determine that the weapon involved was an automatic weapon based on a mere preponderance of the evidence.

United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117 …

Here the en banc court vacated a panel's previous holding (that the Circuit's rule that unpublished decisions have no precedential effect was unconstitutional) - reasoning that decision was now "moot" due to the fortuituous intervention of the IRS.

One of the most intriguing cases of the year 2000 …

United States v. Munoz, 233 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2000) (Judge Tallman)
United States v. Meyer. 234 F.3d 319 (7th Cir. 2000) (Judge Rovner)
United States v. Ofcky, No. 00-1420, (7th Cir. 1/23/2001) (Judge Cudahy)

To us, one of the most significant legal debates of the last decade involved …

Here the Court held that there was no due process violation when the sentencing court determined by a mere preponderance of the evidence that the defendant should be sentenced for first degree murder even though he had not been charged with that crime.

United States v. Munoz, 233 …

Here, disagreeing with decisions from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the term "any court" as used in 18 USC § 922(g) to define prior convictions does not include foreign convictions.

In this case the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession …

The defendant in this case was charged by indictment with one count of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841. At the same time it filed the indictment, the Government filed a “Notice of Enhanced Penalty,” in which it stated that it would …

Here the Court made a strong and persuasive case for the proposition that in marijuana cases, involving only small amounts which are disputed, the proper statutory maximum sentence is one year under 21 USC § 841(b)(4) not five years under 841(b)(1)(C).

This case addressed an important issue regarding …

Here the Court dismissed a habeas corpus petition holding that as a general rule the Attorney General is neither the custodian of an INS detainee in the requisite sense nor the proper respondent to a habeas petition.

In this case, the Court held that the Attorney General should …