The plaintiff in this case, John M. Purdy, sued his criminal defense attorney, Jacob D. Zeldes, for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and misrepresentation arising from Zeldes’ alleged inadequate representation of Purdy during the investigation and through Purdy’s trial and appeal on various convictions arising from violations of the Anti-Kickback ...

In an immigration-law ruling of some significance, Judge Chin held in this case that a special “clock stopping” provision of the immigration law that was added in 1996 cannot be applied retroactively to crimes committed before the date on which the provision went into effect.

Under the Immigration and Nationality ...

Here the Court unanimously held that the police need only “reasonable suspicion” - not probable cause - to search the home of a person on probation who has “agreed” as part of his probation order to submit to searches of his home at any time.

In a case that will ...

This is a decision that highlights the importance of never taking for granted the authority and jurisdiction of a Federal agency - no matter how customary their actions may appear to be. In this case, acting on a tip, a Customs official alerted two Border Patrol agents who were patrolling ...

In this case the Court found that the district court had erred by failing to make adequate inquiries into the alleged breakdown of trust between the defendant and his counsel - stating in part: "The district court's finding that there was no break in communication between Adelzo-Gonzalez and his attorney ...

The issue addressed in this case was one that the Fifth Circuit had never previously addressed, namely “does the Fourth Amendment permit a non-routine, outbound search at the functional equivalent of the border, when Customs Agents reasonably suspect a traveler is smuggling contraband?”

In 1998, the defendant in this case, ...

In this case the court held that Apprendi's recidivism exception encompasses the issue of whether prior convictions arose from offenses "committed on occasions different from one another." (Id., at 155.) The court first reasoned that "the separateness of the convictions is not a fact which is different in kind from ...